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SHOCKS, SHORTS AND SPARKS-STRICT LIABILITY
FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Safety Council divides deaths due to electrical acci-
dents into four broad categories: (a) home wiring and appliances;
(b) industrial wiring and appliances; (c) other and unspecified current;
and (d) generating plants, distribution stations and transmission lines.1
In addition to deaths, thousands of incidents of personal injury and
property damage are attributable to shocks, shorts, sparks and fires. Be-
cause of the omnipresence of electricity and its transmission equipment,
the factual permutations where injury and damage occur also number in
the thousands. One way electric accidents occur is when people come
into contact with utility lines strung over their private property, such as
when a ladder, antenna or person on a roof touches an uninsulated, cur-
rent carrying wire. Another set of facts involves contact with lines
strung over other property-a helicopter colliding with transmission
lines, a child's model airplane coming into contact with power lines or a
person touching a downed power line. Next, accidents occur in which
the electricity itself is the culprit, arcing through defective equipment
onto a consumer's property or into a consumer's home in an unexpected
and dangerous way.
Many of these electricity-caused or electricity-related accidents re-
sult in litigation. Does this ever-increasing panoply of electrical acci-
dents causing property damage and personal injury require
reexamination of the basis for liability in these cases? This Comment
examines whether, in California, strict liability2 should be applied in
cases involving utility companies for damages resulting from either defec-
tive electricity or manufacturing or design defects of the transmission
system. If strict liability can be applied to electrical utilities, to what
1. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 12 (1984).
2. In this Comment the terms strict liability and products liablity are used interchangea-
bly to describe a doctrine of plaintiff recovery which holds the manufacturer, and all partici-
pants in the chain of distribution, liable for defective products in the absence of fault. In
California, the liability analysis involves finding an injury caused by a "defect" in design or
manufacture and that the injury occurs through the use of the product in a reasonable and
foreseeable manner. Jurisdictions outside California may differentiate the two terms. See L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3.03 (1986).
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extent and under what factual circumstances may a court impose
liability?
A California Court of Appeal in the Third District recently held in
Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.3 that electricity furnished to the plain-
tiff was a consumable "product" rather than a service4 and that the elec-
tricity was in the "stream of commerce." The court then held that since
the product was within the ambit of California's strict liability law,6 the
utility company which commercially supplied the electricity was subject
to strict liability in tort for personal injuries caused by the defective
electricity.
Just two months earlier, a second district court of appeal had de-
cided in United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Southern California Edison Co.7
that strict liability did not apply to high voltage transmission facilities
owned, used and operated by a privately owned electric utility. That
court ruled that such facilities and the electricity supplied were neither
placed in the "stream of commerce" nor was the electricity a "product"
delivered to consumers.'
This Comment examines whether these two cases can be reconciled
under the parameters of California's tort law to represent a consistent
view of strict liability for electricity-related personal injuries. The two
cases are examined in the context of utility companies' historical liability
for personal injuries and property damage and the development of strict
liability in California. The issues addressed by this inquiry include: Is
electricity a product?; what is defective electricity?; when does electricity
enter the "stream of commerce"?; and can strict liability or a modified
concept of enterprise liability9 attach to the transmission facilities? As a
3. 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
4. Id. at 82-83, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The determination that electricity is a product
was crucial to the court's decision. It was the first time a California court ruled that electricity
was a consumable product. See generally infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
5. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
6. Id. at 82-84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The court identified a manufactured item (elec-
tricity), placed in the market (passing through the plaintiff's meter and into her home), that
had a defect (abnormally high voltage) and was to be used without inspection by the consumer
(Ms. Pierce). The court next identified the public policy justifications for applying strict liabil-
ity as including: providing a short cut to liability where negligence may be present but is
difficult to prove; providing an economic incentive to improve product safety; inducing the
reallocation of resources toward safer products; and spreading the risk of loss among all who
use the product. See infra notes 10-18.
7. 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985).
8. Id. at 707-09, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-24.
9. Enterprise liability describes a system of liability not confined to "products" or
"fault." It encompasses a broadened concept of liability for all harms associated with an activ-
ity by an "enterprise" upon proof of injury to the plaintiff. The "enterprise" will almost al-
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corollary question, the inquiry asks whether sales of all services as op-
posed to sales of only products can be governed by strict liability. If not,
why not? If only certain services, why those and not others?
The reader must be willing to step back and reexamine the doctrine
of strict liability and its underlying economic and policy justifications in
order to determine whether such policies may be applied to public and
private utility companies that provide electricity.
II. RECENT CASE LAW
In Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 10 during a lightning storm in
the Meridian area of Sutter County, California, lightning struck and
damaged two power transformers on Gail Pierce's property."1 Her house
lost its electricity and she called a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) repair
crew. The PG&E crew replaced the two transformers; however, the sec-
ond transformer exploded while it was being connected and sent 7000
volts of electricity into Ms. Pierce's home. 2 The resulting electrical
surge ruptured a propane gas pipe and started a fire at the rupture point
in a storage shed.13 As Ms. Pierce reached for the gas tank's shutoff
valve she received a terrible shock which tightened her hand to the valve
and pulled her body on the metal tank. The surge of electricity had
charged the house's wiring. After about twenty seconds, Ms. Pierce was
thrown off the tank and down an embankment. 4 She was severely
injured.
The appellate court ruled that "'[t]he distribution might well be a
ways be a commercial manufacturer, lessor, bailor, retailer or wholesaler. See generally
Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension
of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L. REv. 401 (1974).
This definition of enterprise liability differs from the enterprise liability applied in cases
involving asbestos and drugs such as DES where the product is harmful and the plaintiff can-
not prove which manufacturer supplied her or him with the product. That type of liability is
also known as "market share" liability. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
10. 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
11. Id. at 74, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
12. Id. The exploding replacement transformer had been previously used at another loca-
tion and had been in storage. There was no evidence that it had malfunctioned in its previous
location, but the PG&E crew did not test the transformer before connecting it to the power-
line. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Plaintiff's initial action alleged negligence and strict liability in tort for defective
products. She alleged that PG&E was "'engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing,
distributing, selling, leasing, renting, to the general public electrical equipment, including the
particular equipment involved in this matter.'" Id. at 74-75, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (quoting
plaintiff's trial brief). Plaintiff's complaint did not identify the electricity itself as defective
until later in the trial. The court ruled that although normally a party can recover only on
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:973
service, but the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordinary user
is a consumable product.' ,15 As a product, the court considered the
electricity to be within California's strict products liability law. The
court then discussed the policies underlying the development of strict
liability, finding that these policies would be furthered by applying the
doctrine here. 6 Finally, the court limited its holding to cases where the
electricity is actually in the "stream of commerce" and expected by the
those causes of action alleged in the complaint, the general rule yields when the matter is in
issue and evidence is received therein without objection. Id. at 78, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
Evidence at trial established that the defective transformer was manufactured by Federal
Pacific Electric Company, and that PG&E had never placed the transformer on the market or
in the "stream of commerce." PG&E could not be strictly liable for a defect in the transformer
since they were a consumer of the transformer. Id. at 76, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87.
At trial the jury only considered a negligence cause of action. The court had granted
PG&E's motion for nonsuit on the issues of strict products liability, ultrahazardous activity
and breach of implied warranty for particular purpose. The jury found by special verdict that
PG&E was not negligent. Id. at 75, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
15. Id. at 82, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (quoting Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87
Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979)). The facts in Ransome were similar to those in Pierce. A
storm and subsequent transformer failure started a fire in a home after approximately 1000-
4000 volts of electricity were transmitted into the house. The court ruled that because the
electricity was defective when it left the electric utility's possession, strict liability was applica-
ble. The utility unsuccessfully argued that the accident was caused by an act of God, but the
court ruled that lightning was a foreseeable and recurring event, negating the utility's defense.
The court in Pierce discussed a hypothetical act of God by stating:
Where lightning strikes a powerline and enters a consumer's home, causing damage,
the utility is not strictly liable because it has not marketed a "product" at all-in
such cases the utility has provided only a connecting medium through which a force
of nature enters the consumer's home and causes injury.
Id. at 84 n.10, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292 n.10.
Defendant vigorously contested plaintiff's assertion that electricity was a product:
"What is electricity? Simply stated, it is aforce, like the wind, with the potential to
do work. Electricity alone cannot perform work. Electricity alone is useless from a
consumer's point of view. Electricity is a stream of electrons that is created, trans-
mitted, distributed, and converted to energy, all within milliseconds. No California
court has ever held that electricity is a product."
Id. at 79 n.3, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 288 n.3 (quoting PG&E's trial brief and motion for nonsuit)
(emphasis in original).
16. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 83, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92. The court held that the
electrical power system presented a huge, complex and highly technical operation beyond the
ability of the injured plaintiff to successfully investigate and beyond the knowledge of the aver-
age juror. The utility itself was in a better position to diagnose-and ultimately to correct-
transmission failures. Id. at 83, 212 Cal. Rptr at 291. The court also held that evidence at trial
showed that the accident could have been avoided through proper testing of the exploding
transformer. Id. at 82, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 291. By applying strict liability, the court provided
incentive to the utility to engage in that proper testing. The court also recognized that while
strict safety regulations are maintained by the Public Utilities Commission (a state agency
charged with regulating all public and private utilities, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 301-320
(West 1975 & Supp. 1986)), nothing in the record indicated that the procedures were incapable
of being made safer. Id. at 83, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The court concluded that applying strict
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consumer to be at marketable voltage. 17 In most cases, it said, this would
be at the point where the electricity is metered onto the premises. How-
ever, the court refused to draw a "bright line" at a particular point, find-
ing that the many variations of metering systems prevented the drawing
of such definite lines.18
In United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Southern California Edison Co., 19
plaintiffs brought actions against an electrical utility for damages result-
ing from a fire. In United Pacific, a kite had become entangled between
two electrical conductors and a telephone cable and pulled the three
wires close enough together to cause an arcing of current.20 The current
melted the conductors, causing an emission of molten aluminum which
dropped and ignited some brush and grass below. A fire started, eventu-
ally destroying over 200 homes.21
The plaintiffs argued that the placement of the conductors and the
positioning of the transmission lines was of defective design and there-
fore, strict liability principles should apply. 2 They urged that the court
apply strict liability to this factual situation because the policy reasons
liability helped spread the costs of injury among the millions of users of electricity instead of
imposing the costs on the injured victim. Id. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
The court's policy discussion mirrored plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities
language:
As a commercial supplier of a product dangerous unless safeguarded, all of the usual
policy arguments dictate that defendant be held strictly liable in tort and should now
bear plaintiff's burden of loss because her injuries were caused by a defect in either
the power supplied, the equipment used by defendant to supply the electricity, or
both.
Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 79 n.4, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 288 n.4.
Defendant argued that the plaintiff merely alleged defective electricity as a way of reach-
ing the defective transformer. "'Now they're talking about electricity, which is simply a way
to backdoor the transformer in.'" Id. at 80 n.5, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 289 n.5. See supra notes
106-07 and accompanying text discussing the court's reasoning in finding for plaintiff on this
issue.
17. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
18. Id.
19. 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985).
20. Id. at 705, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 821. Plaintiffs were homeowners and insurance compa-
nies subrogated to the rights of other homeowners. Defendants included the General Tele-
phone Co. of California, Santa Barbara Cable Television Co. and Southern California Edison.
Id. at 700, 704, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
21. Id. at 704-05, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
22. Id. at 706-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22. Plaintiffs produced expert evidence that an
alternative configuration of the conductors and powerlines would have prevented the arcing of
electricity. The cost of the construction would not have been more than the actual configura-
tion used; in fact, the alternate configuration was shown in the Edison manual. Id. at 706, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 821. The plaintiffs argued that the "defect in the Edison facilities is that the
combination of closeness of conductors and sag between poles permitted arcing that reasonably
could have been avoided." Id.
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for the doctrine would be served.23 The court, however, ruled that the
electricity traveling through the lines was not yet in a marketable form,
and thus was not a "product."24 The court also held that the cable used
to transmit the voltage was not a package for the power that could be
considered defective.2 - The court reasoned that high voltage transmis-
sion facilities are not placed in the stream of commerce as such, but re-
main in the control of the utility.26 Finally, the court concluded that the
"service" of electricity was not meant to be included under the aegis of
strict liability.
27
While the court in Pierce held that the electricity in question was a
product, the court in United Pacific ruled that the high voltage electric
transmission facilities alleged as defective by the plaintiff were not prod-
ucts. In Pierce, the court ruled that the electricity had entered the stream
of commerce by passing through the plaintiff's metering system. In
United Pacific, the court found that the facilities could not have entered
the stream of commerce because they were owned and controlled by the
utility at the place where the accident occurred. Finally, whereas the
court in Pierce found strict liability principles best served by holding elec-
tricity to be a product, the court in United Pacific found that a negligence
23. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
24. United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
25. Id. Accord Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d
736 (1976) (plaintiff's strict liability claim denied because electricity in power line had not been
placed into the stream of commerce).
26. United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 707-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23. Plaintiffs argued
that Edison had placed the entire transmission system in the stream of commerce by using it to
transmit the electricity. Had Edison leased, licensed or sold its design pattern on the system,
plaintiffs argued, strict liability could apply. Thus it was irrational not to apply it here. The
court reminded the plaintiffs that none of those things occurred. The concept of marketing-
which necessarily involved the transfer of property rights-was not present. If there was no
marketing, the court concluded, there could be no placing of the product into the stream of
commerce. Id. at 708, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 823. See infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text
for further discussion on expanding the "stream of commerce" concept.
27. United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 708-10, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24. The court con-
sidered the economic and public policies underlying strict liability-cost spreading and risk
distribution-as well as strict liability's evidentiary impact. The court concluded these goals
would not be met. First, Southern California Edison, the utility company supplying the elec-
tricity and maintaining the utility lines, could not raise rates without prior Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) approval. Thus, the utility could not necessarily pass on the burden to its
customers. Second, since utilities are so highly regulated, there was little incentive, beyond the
already high standard of safety required by PUC regulation, to make the system even safer.
Finally, the United Pacific court found that the plaintiffs were not prohibited from discovering
the facts necessary to prove their case. The knowledge of plaintiffs' expert witness and the fact
that the power lines were in open view led the court to believe that the plaintiffs had no great
difficulty in bringing the action as a common negligence action. Id. at 708-09, 209 Cal. Rptr.
at 823-24.
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cause of action was sufficient to provide plaintiffs with a remedy as well
as to maintain an incentive for safe delivery of electricity."8
In reconciling these two cases, the determinative issue is when and
where the electricity (and the attendant equipment) becomes a "product
within the stream of commerce." If the electricity contains a defect
before the point of transformation it will not be termed a "product." The
point of transformation is where the "product" enters into the "stream of
commerce."29 While Pierce held that the point of transformation was the
meter outside a residence, that was not to be a hard and fast rule."0
United Pacific, while not answering that exact question, seemed to agree.
The court there found that electricity could not be considered a product
within the stream of commerce until it was delivered to the consumer.31
Although these two cases are factually distinguishable,32 and thus legally
reconcilable, they may not be consistent with the doctrinal policy bases
of California's strict liability law.
III. HISTORY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
Historically, electric utility liability in California has been governed
by a negligence standard. However, courts have often required a higher
duty of care on suppliers of electricity. The courts considered electricity
as special, requiring the use of "very great care,"3 3 or they saw electricity
as a "dangerous quantity of electric fluid ' 34 carried by "deadly wires.
' 's3
28. See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text.
29. See Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292; United Pacific, 163 Cal. App.
3d at 707, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
30. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
31. United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822. "'[Electricity] is not in
a marketable state and the doctrine [strict liability] was not intended to apply in such cases."'
Id. (quoting Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976)). "[U]ntil
actually delivered, the electricity has not been placed in the 'stream of commerce.'" Id. (quot-
ing Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976)).
32. The most important distinguishing fact is that in Pierce the challenged defect mani-
fested inside the plaintiff's home whereas in United Pacific the alleged defect was not on plain-
tiff's property. See text accompanying supra notes 10-31 for a narrative of both cases.
33. Giraudi v. Electric Improvement Co., 107 Cal. 120, 40 P. 108 (1895). In Giraudi, the
plaintiff, a dishwasher who was sent up to the roof of the hotel where he worked, was injured
when he came in contact with an electric wire lying there. The court found that the
"[d]efendant was using a dangerous force, and one not generally understood," which required
thh use of the heightened standard of care. Id. at 124, 40 P. at 112.
34. Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182, 184, 106 P. 587, 589 (1910). In Dow, the
plaintiff was a repairman for the defendant. While on a call to repair a grounded wire, he
touched a "live" wire which had sagged into the same area. Id.
35. Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 588, 112 P. 459, 463
(1910). The plaintiff recovered for the wrongful death of her husband firefighter who stepped
on charged wires when the defendant negligently failed to turn off the current. Id.
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In Polk v. City of Los Angeles,36 the California Supreme Court held that
determining the negligence of the utility company involved considering
"the well known dangerous character of electricity and the inherent risk
of injury to persons or property if it escapes .... Hence the care used
must be commensurate with and proportionate to that danger.
37
Although supplying electricity has never been held to be an ul-
trahazardous activity requiring a standard of care higher than the negli-
gence standard,38 courts have taken special notice of electricity's
potential for harm. As long ago as 1913 a California appellate court, in
discussing electricity, concluded that:
"It may be regarded as a solecism to say that one may own a
thing not susceptible of definition and the nature and character
of which is practically unknown, yet when one gathers from the
elements an energy or force which he may store, transmit, and
utilize, he thereby appropriates to his own use that thing,
whatever it may be, and it is a subject of ownership, of barter
and sale, so long as it is his possession.
' 39
36. 26 Cal. 2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1945). In Polk, the city maintained power lines passing
through branches and foliage of trees. Constant contact with the trees caused the insulation to
wear off the wires. The plaintiff, a tree trimmer, was injured when his 12 foot pruning hook
came in contact with the uninsulated wire. Id.
37. Id. at 525, 159 P.2d at 934.
38. Liability for ultrahazardous activities involves "absolute" liability for injuries or prop-
erty damage caused by an ultrahazardous activity, such as rocket testing, explosives use or the
use of poisonous gas. The duty is established when the defendant carries out the ul-
trahazardous activity, regardless of the fact that he uses utmost care to prevent harm. Luthr-
inger v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948). In Luthringer, the plaintiff entered his place
of work after the defendant had released some poisonous gas for exterminating purposes.
Plaintiff inhaled the fumes and was seriously injured. The court ruled that use of poisonous
gas was an ultrahazardous activity which necessitated a heightened standard of liability. Other
factors considered by the court included the location of the activity of defendant and whether
the activity was one of common usage. Id. at 498, 190 P.2d at 8. An activity is a matter of
common usage if it is customarily carried on by a great mass of mankind or by many people in
a community. Id. The following cases contain illustrations of ultrahazardous activities:
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) (oil well operations);
Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967) (rocket
testing program); Balding v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 54 Cal. Rptr. 717
(1966) (blasting); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 23 Cal. App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1260 (1937) (use of
crop spray containing arsenic).
The plaintiff in Pierce argued that the maintenance of the high-voltage power system was
an ultrahazardous activity. The court concluded that it was not. "ITihe doctrine scrutinizes
not the accident itself but the activity which led up to the accident-in this case, the mainte-
nance of high-voltage powerlines and transformers... [which] has become pervasive and is
now entirely commonplace." Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 85, 212
Cal. Rptr. 283, 293 (1985); see also McKenzie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d
731, 19 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1962).
39. Hill v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 22 Cal. App. 788, 806, 136 P. 492, 500 (1913) (quoting
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After the development of products liability in California, one might
have expected it to govern electric utilities. After all, courts had histori-
cally acknowledged electricity's "dangerous character." While danger-
ousness is not always a necessary precedent to the application of strict
liability, a basic maxim in the development of the doctrine is preventing
accidents.' The high degree of care consistently imposed on electrical
utilities evinces the same concern.4 1  Post-Greenman4' cases, however,
have determined electric utility liability without mentioning strict liabil-
ity.43 Electricity itself was never held to be a product until Pierce.' No
cases have, as yet, held that production or delivery of electricity should
be governed by strict liability.
IV. HISTORY OF STRICT LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
A. Cases
Although well documented, a brief discussion of the evolution of
strict liability in California is necessary to understand its application to
electricity and electrical utilities. Justice Traynor's45 famous statement
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,46 -that "a manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
Terrance Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., 1 Cal. App. 511, 82 P. 562 (1905))
(plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of his father who was killed after receiving a jolt of
electricity while trying to start a pump in the mine where he worked).
40. See generally Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
41. In Holmes v. Southern California Edison Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 43, 177 P.2d 32 (1947),
the jury instructions imposed "the highest or utmost degree of care in the construction, main-
tenance and operation of said [electrical] wire." Id. at 55, 177 P.2d at 39.
42. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). The decision in Greenman judicially solidified the application of products liability in
California. See infra notes 70-88.
43. See, eg., Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170,496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr.
908 (1972); Scally v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806, 100 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1972).
44. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 82, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291; see supra notes 10-18 and
accompanying text. As an expanding doctrine whose purpose is to prevent accidents and en-
sure that costs of manufacturing and design defects are borne by the manufacturers, strict
liability might have easily accommodated electrical "accidents." However, courts have since
consistently termed the production, delivery and existence of electricity a "service" falling
outside of the strict liability doctrine. Part of the explanation may be that because many
electric liability cases were decided in an earlier scientific age when electricity was not com-
monly understood, courts had difficulty determining whether electricity had any inherent sub-
stantial qualities, except the abilities to do work and do harm. The historical terming of
electricity as a service persisted with the help of stare decisis, notwithstanding technological
advances which allow us now to see and measure the particles of electricity.
45. Justice Roger Traynor served on the Supreme Court of California as both an Associate
and Chief Justice and wrote several of the products liability opinions quoted in this Comment.
46. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being" 4 -- has long been a definitive articu-
lation of the strict liability equation. However, to fully understand strict
liability concepts, it is important to recognize that this manifesto of strict
liability grew from a long and impressive history of non-negligence based
liability.
The analytical roots of strict liability evolved from two interrelated
yet distinct concepts of protection: the protection of people from their
neighbors' dangerous activities (generally relating to property damages);
and the implied warranty in a sale of goods to a consumer (generally
related to personal injury). The first line of protection began with
Fletcher v. Rylands,4" where the court statec4:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in
at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable
for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its es-
cape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was
owing to the plaintiff's default; or perhaps that the escape was
the consequence of vis major, or the act of God .... 49
While this rule is not a statement of strict liability, it is a judicial realiza-
tion that a higher degree of liability is necessary in some situations than
the standard negligence theory. The only intervening factors that would
dispell liability would be contributory negligence ("owing to the plain-
tiff's default"), or an act of God ("vis major"). Therefore, a different
standard of care was set forth for such inherently dangerous activities.
The plaintiff was not required to prove that the defendant acted in an
unreasonable manner nor was there discussion of a reasonable person
standard.50
Incorporating the standard of Fletcher v. Rylands, the California
47. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
48. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), 3 H. & C. 774 (Ex. 1865). In Rylands,
the defendant built a reservoir on his land over an old coal mine. The coal had been taken out
of the mine some time earlier. A defect in the subsoil caused the water to leak out of the
reservoir and flood the plaintiff's land. Defendant was held liable for the damage to the plain-
tiff's land, even though the damage was the result of a latent defect in the subsoil and was not a
direct action by the defendant.
49. L.R. 1 Ex. at 279-80.
50. The reasonable person standard of common law negligence was not evident. By drop-
ping this element from those necessary to prove liability, the court lightened the plaintiff's
load. The test there was essentially the same as that for an ultrahazardous activity. See supra
note 38.
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Supreme Court, in Green v. General Petroleum Corp., stated that when
an injury is directly caused by a neighbor's action on his own property
"there is an absolute liability for the consequential damage, regardless of
any element of negligence.., that may have caused the injury.""2 Simi-
larly, in Spano v. Perini Corp., a New York case, a plaintiff sustained
property damage resulting from defendant's use of dynamite in a blasting
operation. The court, in approving plaintiff's strict liability claim, stated
"one who engages in blasting must assume responsibility, and be liable
without fault, for any injury he causes to neighboring property.
'54
The implied warranty root in the history of strict liability grew from
imposing penalties for defective foodstuffs. Early English law held such
high regard for "non-corrupt" food and drink that criminal statutes were
enacted for violations.5 A buyer was entitled to rely on the safety of food
sold in the marketplace. There was a distinction, however, between im-
plied warranties between dealers (governed by general warranty rules)
and those between a dealer and consumer (governed by the expanded
doctrine of implied warranty).5 6 Limitations were imposed in the con-
sumer-dealer relationship to ensure the equitable placement of liability.
Implied warranties applied only when the sale was on the "open mar-
ket"5" and for the "immediate use"58 by the consumer.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
stated "'that accompanying all sales by a retail dealer of articles of food
for immediate use there is an implied warranty that the same is fit for
human consumption.' "60 The following year, the California Supreme
Court held in Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.6 that "'in the absence of
an express warranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under
modem conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in origi-
nal packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may be dam-
51. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
52. Id. at 334, 270 P. at 955.
53. 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
54. Id. at 15, 250 N.E.2d at 33, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
55. F. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER (1951).
56. Id § 1.2.
57. "Open market" would seem to mark the beginning of the "stream of commerce" re-
quirement. The implied warranties were only available to consumers within a marketplace
environment.
58. The "immediate" use requirement is commensurate with the "reasonably intended"
use requirement of the strict liability doctrine as it has evolved in California. See infra notes
82-84 and accompanying text.
59. 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938).
60. Id. at 29-30, 12 N.E.2d at 559 (quoting Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 72, 121
N.E. 471, 472 (1918)).
61. 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
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aged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade.' ,62 As a
result of this court-imposed duty, the plaintiff, injured through adulter-
ated or contaminated food, was not required to prove the defendant's
unreasonable conduct or fault in packaging or manufacturing the food.
Further, this standard did not require privity of contract for a plaintiff to
recover-the warranty extended to any person who consumed the food.6 3
The implied warranty of fitness for purpose was also developed
through a series of cases involving defective automobiles. 6 In Winterbot-
tom v. Wright,6 5 the court acknowledged that latent defects of a motor
coach rendered it unsafe and unfit for expected performance. However,
liability was not imposed. The court, favoring limited liability exposure,
drew the line at privity6 6 and held that since the injured plaintiff was not
the purchaser no implied warranty attached.
In Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.,67 a New York case, Justice Car-
dozo held that a nonpurchasing plaintiff could sue a manufacturer for
negligent manufacture and failure to inspect a car wheel that collapsed
while plaintiff was driving. Although the decision was based on negli-
gence principles-a failure of the manufacturer to inspect-the court de-
livered this resounding language focusing on the foreseeability of injury
as a means to determine liability:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
62. Id. at 281, 93 P.2d at 804 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633
(1915)).
63. Courts initially required privity of contract for claims based on the implied warranty.
If the plaintiff was not the buyer, he could not recover. In Klein, the court extended the term
"consumer" to include any person for whose use the product was intended. It is not necessary
that the consumer have purchased the product at all. "All those in the legitimate channels of
trade" is a move toward a pure foreseeability doctrine.
64. Automobiles are perhaps the most symbolic "product" of mass production in
America. Henry Ford's system of assembly is owed a great deal of credit, not only for its
contribution to industrial production techniques but also for supplying a product that has led
to the development of new social, economic and legal concepts, including strict liability.
65. 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, the plaintiff, a
postal employee, was thrown from a small mail coach that defendant had supplied to the
Postmaster-General. The court ruled that plaintiff had no cause of action since he was not in
privity of contract with defendant.
66. The court in Winterbottom was concerned with restricting liability so as not to impinge
upon manufacturing's growth. It was essentially the same argument employed in Ryan v.
New York Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) and in Justice Andrew's dissenting opinion in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). The
argument envisioned ever-expanding liability and the courts were concerned with limiting lia-
bility. Judges feared that if a manufacturer's duty extended to all resulting injuries, the manu-
facturing machine would be severely stifled. Their solution was to create a foreseeability
doctrine which vested in courts the power to limit liability.
67. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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thing of danger.... Whether a given thing is dangerous may be
sometimes a question for the court and sometimes a question
for the jury.... We are dealing now with the liability of the
manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the mar-
ket to be used without inspection by his customers.68
Shifting away from the privity requirement of Winterbottom, the court
instead emphasized that defendants should be liable for any foreseeable
injuries caused by their defective products, due to the dangerous charac-
ter of the product and the inability of the consumer to detect a defect.6 9
The two streams of liability were evolving into a doctrine whose pri-
mary concern was the protection of people injured by dangerous prod-
ucts through no fault of their own. Due to industrialization, the dangers
of society were outgrowing the ability of the negligence system to protect
people and divide liability along the most equitable lines.
Finally, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., ° a California case decided
on negligence grounds, set the stage for a cohesive and definitive state-
ment of products liability. Ms. Escola, a waitress, was injured when a
bottle of Coca-Cola broke in her hand. She sued Coca-Cola, claiming
negligence in the bottling process and manufacturing of the bottle. The
court rendered judgment in her favor. The majority opinion, relying on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,71 ruled that the defendant had not over-
come the presumption of negligence thereby created. Escola is famous
not for the majority's holding, but rather for Justice Traynor's concur-
ring opinion, in which he stated:
68. Id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 383-84, 111 N.E. at 1053. This expression of heightened liability is found further
in the words of Justice Cardozo: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of appre-
hension." Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
70. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
71. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine creating a presumption of
breach of duty and an inference of proximate cause. When translated, it means "the thing, or
affair, speaks for itself." It is another procedural advantage for plaintiffs in proving their case.
The three conditions necessary to fulfill the doctrine are: (1) the accident must be of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. Albers
v. Greyhound Corp., 4 Cal. App. 3d 463, 471, 84 Cal. Rptr. 846, 850 (1970) (plaintiff injured
when he lifted a box of heavy metal cutters, which broke while lifting-box containing the
cutters had just been delivered from the defendant carrier); see also Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) (plaintiff injured by exploding bottle when she
reached into a cooler where defendant's agent had placed bottles of Coca-Cola); Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (unconscious plaintiff injured by doctors and
nurses who performed an appendectomy could not specifically name the person who had in-
jured him).
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I believe the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be sin-
gled out as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like
the present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized
that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings.72
Justice Traynor gave the following rationale for his opinion:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inher-
ent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.... The
cost of an injury.., can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.73
Subsequently, Justice Traynor's views on strict liability were adopted by
a majority of the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.74
In California, strict liability for manufacturing defects in products
gradually grew to reach each link in the marketing chain-not only man-
ufacturers, but lessors, bailors, licensors, retailers and wholesalers. 7" By
imposing liability wherever possible in the chain of marketing, the court
72. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
74. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was
injured while using a power tool manufactured by defendant. The court determined that it was
time for the strict liability doctrine to ground in tort rather than contract. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d
at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. (emphasis added). Justice Traynor refused to
allow manufacturers to define their own scope of liability for defective products. Between
Escola and Greenman, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was enacted, and presumably
Justice Traynor was concerned with possible defenses to strict liability stemming from the
Code. The first draft of the U.C.C. was prepared in 1952. As revised it was subsequently
adopted by every state in the country, except Louisiana, between 1957 and 1967. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 16 (West 1977). The implied warranty sections appli-
cable to tort liability are the warranties of fitness for particular purpose (§ 2-315) and for
merchantability (§ 2-314). Possible defenses available to manufacturers would be written dis-
claimers (§ 2-316(2)), course of dealing or trade usage (§ 2-316(3)), and possibly notions of
privity, notice or other disclaimers. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-300 to -316 (1976). The U.C.C.
is codified in California at CAL. COM. CODE § 1101 (West 1975).
75. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (bailors
and lessors); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (retailer); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (licensee);
Canifax v. Hercules Power Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965) (wholesaler).
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elevated plaintiff's recovery as the predominant concern. This judicial
shift from protecting manufacturers to protecting plaintiffs has continued
and spread throughout the United States.76  Plaintiffs' protection ex-
panded as privity was not required and third parties, bystanders-every-
body within foreseeable harm who had been injured through defective
manufacture-could recover.77
In Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.,78 the California Supreme Court fur-
ther expanded products liability by eliminating the distinction between
design and manufacturing defects finding no legally justifiable distinction
between the two. In Pike, the court held that "since a product may be
equally defective and dangerous if its design subjects protected persons to
unreasonable risk as if its manufacture does SO," '79 there is no rational
distinction between the two. In Pike, the plaintiff in a wrongful death
action attempted to show that the death had been caused by a defectively
designed paydozer.80 Because it lacked rear view mirrors, the paydozer,
plaintiff argued, possessed an inherent design defect which created a
blind spot behind the driver. 1 After Pike, a plaintiff could argue a safer
possible design without proof of a physically observable defect. Thus, in
76. The Restatement of Torts developed an analagous doctrine of strict liability which
reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Federal and state courts all recognize the
doctrine in one form or another.
77. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969). "If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user .... Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects .... ." Id.
at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
78. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
79. Pike, 2 Cal. 3d at 475, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636. Because this case dealt
with an omission (design defect), it expanded the cause of action to a more subjective level.
Previously, only affirmative defective acts could qualify. However, defects in design are poten-
tially more dangerous than defects in manufacturing because a manufacturing defect at least
has physical evidence which can be inspected. Design defects are invisible to all but the
trained eye.
80. Id. at 469, 467 P.2d at 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
81. Id.
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an effort to make injured plaintiffs whole, the court provided another
avenue of proving liability.
In Barker v. Lull Engineering, Co.,82 the supreme court developed
the current California standard for proving a design defect. The court
held that a product is defective in design if
it fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner, or... the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove
... that on balance the benefits of the challenged design out-
weigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
In interpreting the second "prong" of the test, the court said that a
jury may consider, among the relevant factors,
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an im-
proved design, and the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative
design.
84
Two further steps in the products liability continuum should be
highlighted. First, in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 5 the court deter-
mined that California's system of comparative fault should be expanded
to include strict liability causes of action to insure that strict liability is
not absolute liability. Thus, if a plaintiff is negligent and his negligence
contributes to his injury, his recovery is lessened in proportion to his
fault.6 Second, in Campbell v. General Motors Corp., the California
82. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
83. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
84. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court essentially provided
manufacturers with a defense to liability by developing this cost-benefit analysis. While prod-
ucts liability has always been conditional liability to the extent that a defect must be proven,
under this second prong a defect can now be proved but rationalized according to the cost-
benefit analysis. By balancing the equities, juries can theoretically arrive at the most "just"
decision. Plaintiffs will argue, however, that the two-prong test can be read as two separate
avenues of proof. If a plaintiff can satisfy the first prong-that is, merely show the product
failed to meet consumer expectation-the cost-benefit analysis would not come into play. The
court in Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891
(1982), indicated that by satisfying the first prong of the test, a prima facie case of strict liabil-
ity existed. Naturally, manufacturer defendants will argue for a narrower reading of Barker
and Campbell, thus allowing the cost-benefit analysis in every case. This will tend to exculpate
the defendant manufacturers if they can convince the jury that, given the factors involved, they
could not have manufactured the product any better.
85. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
86. Comparative fault is a system of equitable allocation of legal responsibility that takes
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Supreme Court re-acknowledged the importance of both the "consumer
expectation" prong of the Barker test and the jury in the determination
of strict liability causes of action.
88
B. Policy Goals of Strict Liability
In order to fully understand strict liability and its possible expansion
and application to electric utilities, the goals of strict liability must first
be discussed.89 In a nutshell, strict liability is applied both to compensate
injured parties and to achieve social ends by reducing accidents. 90
The first policy justification supporting strict liability is the concept
of loss spreading.91 A manufacturer can spread the cost of personal inju-
ries among all users, not just the injured few who are often blameless and
injured by chance. This loss spreading relieves a significant burden from
the faultless plaintiff and shifts it to the manufacturing entity which can
then pass it on to the entire user constituency as a cost of doing business.
Under strict liability, the price a consumer pays for a product reflects
societal costs as well as production and distribution costs. Thus, the en-
terprise charges and the public pays a more precise "true" cost of the
enterprises' doing business.
A second policy justification for imposing strict liability is that of
relieving the plaintiff's evidentiary burden.92 Manufacturers occupy a
better position to understand why a "product" failed; to make the in-
jured, unknowing plaintiff prove the often difficult standard of fault
would be onerous.93 Proof of negligence in such cases may be so com-
into account the actions of the injured plaintiff. If a plaintiff is 50% at fault, his total recovery
will be reduced by 50%. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975), which established the concept in California in a negligence format.
87. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
88. Id. at 125-26, 649 P.2d at 232-33, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. Campbell reached the
supreme court on appeal after defendant had prevailed on a motion for summary judgment.
The court ruled that this action, brought for the lack of safety features on a bus, contained
factual determinations such that only a jury could rule on the contested design.
89. Strict liability may be thought of as a process-a response to society's needs-as well
as a set of articulable legal goals.
90. This is one of the commonly cited reasons for imposing strict liability. Letting plain-
tiffs recover even though the injury was not defendant's "fault" supposedly leads manufactur-
ers to create safer products and use safer techniques to avoid the costs of liability.
Theoretically, it costs less to create safer items than to pay out judgments.
91. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
92. Id. at 517.
93. This is another common reason cited for the use of strict liability. It is basically unfair
to require injured consumer plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of proving fault. Manufacturers
use highly technical equipment making it difficult and expensive, even with liberal discovery
rules, for a plaintiff to review the defendant's manufacturing operation to determine how his
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plex that injured plaintiffs need an equitable short cut to liability. More-
over, strict liability provides an impetus for manufacturers to create safer
items and operate in a more responsible way. 9 4 The incentive is to avoid
accidents before they occur by investing in safer products and
procedures.
These justifications exhibit three interrelated but distinct concerns:
economic (risk distribution); legal (alleviating the plaintiff's burden); and
social (safety impetus). In 1978, Barker added a fourth concern to the
above noted triad-that of the interpersonal (consumer expectation). 95
To justify any extension of the doctrine, therefore, all four policy goals
must be satisfied.
Strict liability is a system which is restrained or expanded as policy
dictates. By weighing policy priorities, a workable balance is achieved.
Aggressive advancement of the strict liability doctrine is consistent with
growing concerns for consumer protection and environmental safety.
"Products liability is only the latest and furthest step in a general recon-
ceptualization of the legal status of consumers." 96 New economic and
social policy considerations suggest an expansion of strict liability to
other facets of consumer commercial relationships.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Electricity is a Product
Electricity is capable of being owned, bartered, sold, stored, stolen
and taxed.97 It is sold in the marketplace. It is purchased by consumers.
It is intended to be used in forseeable and reasonable ways and the con-
injury was caused and to prove negligence. The defendant is often in the better position to
know why the injury occured. By alleviating the plaintiff's burden, courts are requiring manu-
facturers to demonstrate for the jury that they "did do the best they could."
94. See generally Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also text accompanying supra note 73.
95. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 239-40 (1978).
96. Comment, supra note 9, at 422; see also Tobriner, Retrospective: Ten Years on the
California Supreme Court, 20 UCLA L. REv. 5 (1972).
97. Electricity is a form of energy that can be produced, confined, controlled, transmitted
and distributed in the stream of commerce. Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 695 P.2d 788
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984); see also Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234
N.W.2d 702 (1975); Wirth v. Mayrath Indus., 278 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1979); Ransome v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979); Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969). In holding that electricity was a product,
the court in Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 477, 410
N.E.2d 620 (1980) stated that "[e]lectrical energy is artificially manufactured, can be mea-
sured, bought and sold, changed in quantity or quality, delivered. .. ." Id. at 481, 410 N.E.2d
at 624.
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sumer has an expectation concerning its fault-free nature.98 Case law has
held electricity to be both a product for products liability actions99 and a
good for the purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code.I" ° "[T]he sale
and delivery of utility products is no more a service than is the sale and
delivery of any other product."101
These characteristics of electricity are commensurate with those of a
product for the traditional purposes of products liability. The Model
Uniform Product Liability Act1°2 defines product as "any object possess-
ing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or as
a component part or parts, and produced for introduction into trade or
commerce."103 A recent Indiana Court of Appeals decision held that
electricity was a product because it was (1) a thing; (2) existing; and
(3) movable, with the latter two qualities operating at the same time. l 4
In discussing the product/service distinction in California, Arthur
Dunne established three categories of services where products are in-
volved: (1) where purely professional or advisory services are performed;
(2) where a product is used by the supplier in the performance of the
service; and (3) where in the course of supplying the service, the cus-
tomer is given a product to use.105 As the challenged "product" moves
98. Because the California application of products liability after Barker depends in part on
consumer expectation, that expectation becomes a substantive quality which must be pleaded
when identifying a product for a products liability cause of action. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
99. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976); Petroski v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 171 Ind. App. 14, 354 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
100. See, eg., Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Mich. App. 347, 251 N.W.2d 580
(1977); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d
316 (1972); see also U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1976). The court in Pierce held that an implied war-
ranty of fitness cause of action under the California Uniform Commercial Code was war-
ranted: "In light of our holding... that electricity is a product for purposes of strict liability
in tort we assume arguendo that electricity may also be considered a good for purposes of the
California Uniform Commercial Code. ... " Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App.
3d 68, 86 n.12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 294 n.12 (1985).
101. See Mallor, Utility "Services" Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Are Public Utili-
ties in For a Shock?, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 89, 96 (1980) (emphasis added).
102. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
103. Id. at 62,717.
104. Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
105. A. DUNNE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CALIFORNIA DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY
§ 40 (1974). A California case illustrating category (1) is Allied Properties v. John A. Blume
& Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972) (engineering study); category (2),
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) (use of a
defective needle while performing medical service); and category (3), Fakhoury v. Magner, 25
Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972) (supplying of defective furniture by landlord); see also
Comment, Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability be Plugged In?, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
775, 780 (1978).
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along the continuum from category one to category three the chances
increase that a court will find it to be a "product" for products liability
purposes.
Where on this continuum would electricity fit? Certainly, the con-
sumer uses electricity. The product is delivered to the consumer and the
consumer utilizes the electricity to light the home, cook the food or
power the television. The product is not being used by the utility in any
way, except in the sense that the electricity may help to run power sta-
tions or serve another labor related function. Clearly, electricity is not
the delivery of any advisory or professional service. Fitting nicely into
category three, utilizing Mr. Dunne's definitions, electricity is deserving
of "product" status.
In Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,"06 the court acknowledged
that no previous California cases had considered whether electricity
could be a product for the purposes of applying strict liability. The ap-
pellate court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.107 After finding
that electricity was a "product" in Ms. Pierce's factual situation, the
court determined that the policy reasons for applying strict liability were
present.
The court in United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Southern California
Edison Co. 108 did not directly discuss whether electricity was a product.
However, in deciding whether strict liability extended to the utility trans-
mission facilities, the court stated that electricity was not a product
within the contemplation of strict liability's creators.'09 The court
seemed to say that before the electricity is transferred to the plaintiff con-
sumer, it is not a product within the contemplation of the doctrine.
Therefore, the court did not consider electricity in the same manner as
the court in Pierce. Instead, it placed predominant importance on the
transfer of some property right, thus signifying the concept of market-
ing.110 In Pierce, the electricity had been marketed, by being transferred
through Ms. Pierce's meter into her home."' Had the electricity in
United Pacific been transferred to a plaintiff consumer, chances are the
court would have found electricity to be a product." 2
106. 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
107. Id. at 82, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91; see also supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
108. 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985).
109. Id at 707, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822; see also supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 707-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
111. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
112. Because the case was one of first impression in California, the United Pacific court
looked to case law from jurisdictions outside California in determining that strict liability
would not apply to the transmission facilities. Essentially, the court in Pierce did the same.
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Terming electricity a product, however, does not end the analysis.
Before strict liability may apply, subsequent questions must be asked.
Courts have limited liability based on two policy concerns: (1) the prod-
uct sold to the consumer is not defective according to the strict liability
formula; and (2) the injury occurs before the product is in a finished,
intended state and, therefore, not within the stream of commerce.
B. What is Defective Electricity?
In Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,1 13 the court found that the
electricity arriving at the plaintiff's home was defective because it was
nearly sixty times its intended voltage.114 The court reasoned that a
manufacturing or production defect occurs when an outcome deviates
from the manufacturer's intended result and the consumer's reasonably
foreseeable expectation. It found that "a defective product is one that
differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly
identical units of the same product line."11 Because 120-140 volts was
the normal voltage delivered to consumers, the 7000 volts delivered to
Ms. Pierce's residence was far in excess of both the plaintiff's reasonable
expectation and the manufacturer's intention. " 'When a product fails to
satisfy... ordinary consumer expectations as to safety in its intended or
reasonably foreseeable operation, a manufacturer is strictly liable for re-
sulting injuries.' 116
Arthur Dunne defined the elements of a defective product in Cali-
fornia in the following manner: (a) the condition of the product must
cause harm to person or property when properly used; (b) the condition
of the product has an unsafe aspect which could be eliminated or made
safer without affecting the planned use of the product; (c) the defect can
stem from material, workmanship or design; (d) the defect need be one
which renders a product unreasonably dangerous; (e) no elements of neg-
ligence need be present; and (f) the defect may be created after the prod-
uct leaves the supplier by the supplier's failure to perceive possible
conditions which make the product unsafe.
1 17
Since Mr. Dunne formulated this definition, however, important ju-
Both courts relied on the same cases. A deciding factor for the United Pacific court was that
the electricity in question had not been transferred to the plaintiff which would have placed it
into the stream of commerce. Therefore, it was not a product for strict liability purposes.
United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 707-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
113. 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
114. Id. at 76-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
115. Id. at 77 n.1, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 287 n.l.
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. A. DUNNE, supra note 105, § 47.
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dicial decisions have altered the inquiry. First, a product no longer must
be "unreasonably dangerous" in order to be defective. Although the Re-
statement of Torts still maintains that language, it has been eliminated by
case law." 8 Second, Barker v. Lull Engineering, Co. 119 refocused the in-
quiry to both the consumer's expectation and the manufacturer's in-
tended result. It was this refocusing that the appellate court in Pierce
held as determinative. 2 ' In addition to being well in excess of Pacific
Gas & Electric's intended result, the 7000 volts actually delivered to Ms.
Pierce was well beyond her, or any homeowner consumer's, expectation.
The electricity at issue in Pierce does, however, generally fit into Mr.
Dunne's definition. It was the "defectiveness" of the electricity that
caused both injury and property damage to Ms. Pierce. The electricity
was properly used. Although the court found that there was possible
comparative negligence,' 21 had the electricity not been "defective," i.e.,
had it been at its normal intended and expected voltage, the injury and
damage would not have occurred. The court found that the delivery
could have been made safer, the defect stemmed from a material (in the
sense that each electron is a material component of the flow of electricity)
and the supplier could have perceived the dangerous conditions.'
22
Although the court in United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Southern Cali-
fornia Edison 123 did not characterize electricity as a product, it did inti-
mate that because high voltage electric transmission facilities are not
placed in the stream of commerce, any defects in the delivery of the elec-
tricity would not trigger strict liability's application. 24 Given the prece-
dent of Barker, had the electricity in United Pacific already been
marketed, the court probably would have found the product (electricity)
to be defective in that the design of the system deviated from the manu-
facturer's intended result and the consumer's expectation. 25
118. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
The court stated "[w]e think that a requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made
the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly increased burden and
represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court." Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162,
104 Cal. Rptr. at 442; see also Luque v. McClean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972).
119. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); see supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
120. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 77 n.1, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 287 n.1.
121. Id. at 84 n.l1, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 293 n.l1.
122. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pierce
123. 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985).
124. Id. at 707-08, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
125. Id.
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C. When is Electricity in the Stream of Commerce?
If it is accepted that electricity can be a product and can be defec-
tive, the next hurdle is to define "stream of commerce" and to discover
when electricity enters this commercial pathway. Although Barker v.
Lull Engineering, Co.'26 does not mention the "stream of commerce,"
courts have used such a term to describe the point where a "product"
comes into existence for products liability purposes. While an item may
have the characteristics of a "product" as that term is generally known, it
is only after the "product" enters a commercial pathway that it becomes
a "product" for purposes of strict liability law. Accordingly, it is impor-
tant to determine when this magical transformation takes place. It is
equally important to determine the courts' reasoning for establishing
such a point.
The court in Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. equated "stream of
commerce" with "marketable voltage."' 27 In most cases that occurs
when the electricity is metered at the consumer's home. 128 At that time
the commercial relationship between consumer and seller is crystallized.
The electricity's reasonable intended use-necessary to the strict liability
equation-does not materialize until metered. 129 Finally, the transmis-
sion instrumentalities themselves are not transferred to the consumer;
they remain in the control of the utility, and thus, not in society's com-
mercial stream.1
30
The court in United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Southern California
Edison Co. concentrated on the stream of commerce question in finding
126. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); see supra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
127. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 292
(1985).
128. Ia
129. Id.
130. Id. How anomalous that under Pierce and United Pacific courts' reasoning, an acci-
dent occurring in an open field would be analyzed under a negligence standard while if that
same accident occurred within the home strict liability would apply. Assume that a child
could be injured by a massive electrical emission in both cases and the child is without fault.
In both, the electricity could be found defective. Yet, only within the home would strict liabil-
ity attach. Or, consider the patient who needs blood while in the hospital. If he gets the blood
while in the hospital, it is normally viewed as incident to a service-no strict liability. See, ag.,
Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); Shepard v.
Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973). Presumably if the
blood is purchased and brought home without any services at all, strict liability would attach.
However, see infra note 146 for a discussion of California Health & Safety Code § 1606 which
statutorily answered this particular question.
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:973
that strict liability should not extend to transmission facilities.' Neces-
sary to its holding was a decision that the stream of commerce require-
ment was fulfilled by the marketing of the electricity. Since the high
voltage facilities were not sold to the plaintiff, and were controlled and
used solely by the supplier, no product was being marketed at the time of
the fire.132 Concurrently, the electricity being transmitted through the
power cables was not being marketed, and therefore, not being placed
into the stream of commerce.
The point where electricity enters the stream of commerce is a judi-
cial determination. In applying strict liability, courts have chosen the
point where it reaches the consumer's meter at either his residence or
business. Some other possible points of transformation could be: (1) the
place of generation; (2) subsequent to or following switching points along
the way; or (3) at the last distribution substation. However, courts have
reasoned that poles, wires and transformers are not sold to the public,
nor is the purpose of the commercial transaction-the sale of electric-
ity-completed until the electricity is actually metered. Until then, the
product is unfinished. 133
In sum, the Pierce court's determination that electricity is a consum-
able product is consistent with existing case law and products liability
policy goals. The holding in United Pacific, that transmission facilities
are not products, also conforms with existing precedent. Does, however,
the holding of United Pacific deserve another look, to see whether the
analytical framework of products liability law and changing societal
needs justify the asserted extension of strict liability to electrical trans-
mission facilities?
D. Should Strict Liability Apply to Transmission Equipment?
Extending strict liability to transmission facilities134 would require a
broad view of both the "product" that the utility company sells and the
point at which the product enters the "stream of commerce." Such a
131. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 707-08, 209
Cal. Rptr. 819, 822-23 (1985).
132. Id.
133. "Where the product has not yet been released for its intended use, the situation is
different.... mhe factors on which the Greenman rule rests have not been brought into
operation as to anyone in the chain of supply." DuNNE, supra note 105, § 42.
134. See generally Comment, supra note 9. For a comparison of this type of enterprise
liability with that of market-share theory, see Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enter-
prise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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holding would impose strict liability from the moment the electricity is
produced at the hydroelectric or nuclear generating plant until the elec-
tricity enters the home. Strict liability would apply if a utility's distribu-
tion equipment and manufacturing design were considered part of the
"product," and the "product" was considered to have entered the stream
of commerce when placed in a position that threatens harm to the
public. 135
New remedies are constantly needed to keep pace with an evolving
society. We require change when existing doctrines fail to remedy plain-
tiffs' injuries or satisfy society's needs. The development of products lia-
bility law focused on this transition by establishing a consumer/
manufacturer base. As with other areas of law, the present liability lines
could not have been expected to last forever. Doctrinal changes are not
only results of legal logic, but also pragmatic reactions to extra-judicial
forces in society.
136
As noted above, 137 imposition of products liability is based on sev-
eral distinct but interrelated concerns: loss spreading, safety precautions,
lightening the plaintiff's evidentiary burden and fulfilling consumer ex-
pectations. Changes in economic, social, legal and interpersonal relation-
ships created a need for new methods of recovery. Products liability law
evolved to fit those needs. Changed perceptions of business enterprises
altered the attitudes of both consumers and courts toward commercial
relationships.
Although the test for applying strict liability is often stated as prod-
ucts versus services, the true distinction is between sales of products ver-
sus sales of services. The transfer qualities of a sale between buyer and
seller are present in either case. If the transaction involves a product
which changes hands within a commercial relationship, "[t]he additional
element of service should not logically preclude the application of a
warranty."
138
A second issue arises in applying strict liability when a product is
used in the rendition of a service: is that product the cause of the injury?
For example, an attorney does not insure the soundness of his opin-
135. See United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 708-09,
209 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823 (1985). Apparently, plaintiffs argued this line of reasoning to the court
and were unsuccessful.
136. Comment, supra note 9, at 423.
137. See text accompanying supra note 95.
138. Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Service" Transactions,
31 OHIo ST. L.J. 580, 595 (1970); see also Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transac-
tions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, UTAH L. REv. 661, 661 n.3 (1974).
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ions. 13 9 Although an attorney does create a "product"-the will, brief or
any other document-it is not a defect in the document itself, however,
that causes the injury. Similarly, architects directly produce a tangible
product-a blueprint plan-and indirectly another tangible product-a
structure. However, the defect in the blueprint does not cause the col-
lapse, the defect in design of material does."4
There are three identifiable situations to consider when products are
supplied during the performance of a service: (1) when the entirety of the
transaction is to transfer the product; (2) when the product is used by the
transferor while performing the service; and (3) when the product used is
incidental to the primary service. Courts employ policy justifications to
differentiate the transactions that could arguably fit into one or more of
these categories. There is a qualitative difference, however, between the
transfer of the product, and the use of a product by a possible defendant.
The existence of the commercial transfer initiates the strict liability
"stream of commerce" component, thus fulfilling traditional strict liabil-
ity concerns.1
41
The loss-spreading argument used to impose strict liability on man-
ufacturers can be applied with varying degrees of effectiveness to purvey-
ors of services. Since manufacturers make use of insurance coverage as a
method of risk distribution, the efficiency of service insurance should be
considered a loss spreading factor, in addition to the simple definition of
"service" or "product."
Similarly, the recipient's reasonable expectations as to quality of
services received may be applied. If the consumer is the focal point, and
the community is the protected standard, "services" as well as "prod-
ucts" might be governed by strict liability. The consumer could then
reasonably expect no defects in all transactions in which he
participates. 142
139. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (no strict
liability to beneficiaries where attorney failed to take account of rule against perpetuities), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
140. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Pancoast v. Rus-
sell, 148 Cal. App. 2d 909, 307 P.2d 719 (1957). Additionally, since there is no mass produc-
tion, plaintiffs do not need the evidentiary advantage nor do architects have sufficient ability to
spread the loss. Id. Neither is an engineer held strictly liable for alleged failures in design.
Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972).
141. However, for a case in which the defective instrument was not transferred, but merely
used, see Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (owner of laundry
strictly liable where customer injured by defective washing machine). See DUNNE, supra note
109 and accompanying text for a similar formulation.
142. The term "reasonable" relates to the consumer's expectations and community stan-
dards rather then the actor's conduct. In Barker, the term "intended or reasonably foresee-
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Supplying electricity, as well as other utilities, has traditionally been
termed the delivery of a "service." '143 However, it is not a true service in
the sense that the consumer bargains for the performance of an act.
14
Rather, it has been deemed a service because the delivery is the action
necessary for the "product" to be used. Historically, courts have uni-
formly held that pure services1 45 cannot justify the application of strict
liability. Of course, courts are now comfortable in applying strict liabil-
ity to "pure" products, such as cars, appliances and household goods.
The hybrid character of electricity, like blood supplied by a hospital,
14 6
provides the courts with their most formidable challenge in applying
strict liability principles.
Courts often rely upon an "essence" test to determine whether strict
liability principles should apply to hybrid entities.147 The analysis con-
siders which element to be more predominant; what is the "essence" of
the challenged sale/service? Courts have sought to divide the hybrid into
able" might be analogous. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-
40 (1978); see also Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another Citadel
Crumble?, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 298, 316 (1977).
143. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text; see also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2775
(West Supp. 1978).
144. This is an evaluation applicable under the Uniform Commercial Code and standard
contract law.
145. "Pure services" would be all services that traditionally have been known as such, e.g.,
work provided by attorneys, architects, accountants, mechanics, florists and judges. However,
if a product were used or transferred during the service transaction, the distinctions would
begin to blur.
146. Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977);
Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973). To eliminate
the judicial inquiry into whether supplying blood was the sale of a product or a service, the
California Legislature enacted Health & Safety Code § 1606 which reads:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same,
or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is declared to be,
for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every person, firm,
or corporation participating therein, and shall not be construed to be, and is declared
not to be, a sale of such whole blood, plasma, blood products, or blood derivatives,
for any purpose whatsoever.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979).
The supplying of blood by a hospital was found to be subordinate to the paramount func-
tion of providing trained medical personnel and specialized facilities to restore patients' health.
Fogo, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 421. The court there distinguished those
commercial transactions in which the essence of the transaction was solely to transfer the
product, where the seller was in the business of selling that product, and for that alone was the
seller paid. Id. An electric utility does precisely that.
For another hybrid example see Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr.
73 (1972), which involved the sale and installation of furniture by a landlord.
147. Reynolds, supra note 142, at 308; see also Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d
15 (1954); Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones & Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 115 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974).
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its component parts. If the product portion was predominant, then strict
liability (or, in the UCC, implied warranty) would apply to the entire
hybrid. If the "service" portion was the focus of the transaction then
courts employ common-law negligence.
In distinguishing sales of products and sales of services, it is wise to
note the historical reasons why strict liability and its predecessor, implied
warranty, attached to products and not to services. The law of product
sales developed in English Law as a legal response to commercial
problems created by England's industrialization.' 48 Services were not be-
ing industrialized at the same pace as sales of products. There was no
concurrent business need for implied warranty in services, as the tradi-
tional legal concepts were still appropriate. 149
The English Sales of Goods Act,5 0 passed in 1894, focused on pro-
tecting consumers who purchased goods:
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the man-
ufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality.
Provided that if the buyer has examined the goods, there
shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such ex-
aminations ought to have revealed.
15 1
Because the implied warranty in product sales was a creation of legisla-
tion rather than of the common law, there was arguably greater judicial
reluctance to apply it in other areas. In the United States, the great
speed of industrialization in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries perpetuated this dichotomy between implied warranty for
products and the negligence standard for services.
Policy considerations did, however, create some legislative protec-
tions. Public concern for the absolute safety of food promulgated the
pure food and drug acts.'" 2 Work-related injuries forced the creation of
148. Comment, supra note 9, at 405; see also Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchant-
able Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
149. This is anomalous in a sense, because a buyer of a "good" had a chance to inspect for a
defect. Caveat Emptor would apply and, in the absence of fraud by the merchant, one would
think that no implied warranty would attach. A service would be unsusceptible to an inspec-
tion because a defect in the service would not be apparent even to an inspecting buyer. See
generally Comment, supra note 9.
150. 1894, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, § 14.
151. Id. § 14(2).
152. F. DICKERSON, supra note 55, at 19-57; see also Comment, supra note 9, at 405-06.
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a no-fault worker's compensation system. 153 These were responses by
the legislature to protect consumers in a highly fragmented society with
mass-produced consumer goods created far from their point of purchase.
By the time Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 154 was decided, the
California Supreme Court recognized that the foundation of warranty in
these cases was no longer contractual-consumer but consumer-tort.1 55 In
establishing products liability, the Greenman court swept aside the
anachronistic contractual definition of implied warranty, but retained the
product/service distinction. This semantic construction has endured and
is now a decisive criteria in deciding when to apply strict liability.
Nevertheless, courts have found that public policy is best served by
applying strict liability at the point where the consumer assumes control
of the product. The application of the doctrine, courts say, should in-
clude factors of economic loss to intervening parties in the chain of com-
merce as well as to the manufacturer. Courts seem to imply that a
logical products liability system should not rely entirely upon indemnifi-
cation but should involve reasonable balancing of the interests
involved.
1 56
Who is the "consumer"-perhaps a better term is "ultimate con-
sumer." The law distinguishes between goods purchased for further pro-
duction and goods that directly satisfy human wants; between the
industrial consumer and the ultimate product-buying consumer. Strict
153. In California, see, e.g., Workmen's Compensation and Insurance & Safety Act of 1917
(codified as amended at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11630-11759) (West 1972)).
154. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
155. Id.
156. There seems to be an inherent difficulty in conceptualizing a system of liability without
fault. There must be a human characteristic which makes us think in terms of individual fault
as blame. Additionally, the law tries to satisfy both plaintiffs' and defendants' points of view.
In some sense this attitude is reflected in the second prong of the balancing test in Barker. See
supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. However, is it not facially absurd to ground strict
liability in reasonableness? The point of strict liability is to disregard the reasonable person.
Justice Mosk's dissent in Daly, supra note 85, highlights this conceptual crisis: "How can
comparative fault exist in a cause of action which proceeds irrespective of fault? What can a
jury compare the plaintiff's fault with if the defendant's fault is not at issue?" Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 783, 575 P.2d 1162, 1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 403 (1978)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Although Justice Mosk was discussing the balancing of liabilities in
Daly's comparative fault equation, his point is well taken. A system of strict liability is inher-
ently and necessarily unconcerned with "reasonableness" in its legal definition. The purpose of
Greenman and its progeny was to remove fault and the reasonable person from the discussion.
See also supra note 81 for discussion regarding the second prong of Barker.
The reasonable person could always agree with a manufacturer. After all, a manufacturer
will have more resources to try their cases with, and they will always argue the importance of
manufacturing as a whole against the injury of just one person. This might seem reasonable to
any jury. In many cases, however, juries sympathize with the injured plaintiff, which might
prompt them to award huge judgments.
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liability applies in transactions involving the latter, but not the former.
The need for marketing the "product" requires some consumer to whom
the product can be marketed.' 57
The word "consumer" can mean (1) an individual buyer of a partic-
ular product, (2) an individual buyer related to a total of purchasable
wants, (3) all buyers who want a particular product, and (4) all buyers as
related to the total of their purchasable wants.' 58 When courts analyze
consumer claims of strict liability, they generally envision one particular
consumer, the plaintiff, purchasing the particular product in question. A
person buys a defective product, is injured by it, brings a cause of action
based on strict liability and the court evaluates the argument based on
those facts. If courts viewed each purchase as representative of the total
consumer population related to the total of their consumable wants,
strict liability could be extended to the point when the product is put into
the chain of marketing, i.e., after created but before it leaves the manu-
facturer. At that point, the product is on its way to be consumed by
someone. The heart of the argument is that consumers need help because
they are so divorced from the products' manufacture and cannot know of
defects. Common interest in common products give no more sophistica-
tion between buyer and seller than the single purchaser who brings the
purchased product home.
Case law has consistently held that a plaintiff becomes a consumer
of electricity only after the electricity is metered at his or her residence.
This is the policy cut-off point; it insulates manufacturers and constricts
liability, while protecting injured plaintiffs.' 59 The consumer's expecta-
tion of when the electricity becomes marketable is given as the common
reason, marketability being equated with expected voltage.160 However,
is the amount of voltage what the consumer expects? Or is it that a con-
sumer expects the voltage, no matter what its power, to be safely trans-
mitted, metered or not. The electricity's reasonably intended use is not
just a factor of the amount of voltage, but of how the voltage is delivered
as well.
16 1
157. This distinction is probably based on the historical supposition that ultimate consum-
ers are less sophisticated and knowledgable, with less bargaining power than commercial con-
sumers. See Comment, supra note 9, at 415-18.
158. Id.
159. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 292
(1985).
160. By defining expected voltage as the consumer expectation, the court seems to answer
its own question. Consumers will always expect the normal house voltage of approximately
110-120 volts; therefore, consumers' expectations will always be defined at the point that volt-
age is stepped-down from the power lines, i.e., at the consumer's meter.
161. This requirement is a combination of both the defendant's intended result and the
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Installing an antenna on a roof carries with it an expectation. The
installer expects that overhanging wires are not so defectively designed as
to cause potential risk of harm. The electricity passing through the wires
enters a consumer's house. The electricity itself is on its way to being
bought. The electricity is being moved, used, and there exists a concomi-
tant expectation as to its value and safe delivery. Yet, there is no strict
liability. Even if the electricity were in a defective state, there would be
no strict liability. Under the reasoning of Pierce and United Pacific, the
doctrine only gains its teeth when electricity passes into the consumer's
private metering system.
162
Creating a definite point where strict liability attaches is arguably
too inflexible a standard in light of the broad remedial purposes of the
doctrine. If a purpose is to protect "innocent" consumers, why attach
meaning to some magical point in time where different standards of lia-
bility exist on either side. One commentator has develped a new test for
determining when a product enters the stream of commerce.1 63 It pro-
vides that the product enters the stream of commerce when it is placed
by the manufacturer (lessor, bailor or retailer) in a manner that makes it
dangerous to the public. This test refocuses the evaluation of the "point"
when strict liability would become applicable to the actions of the
defendant and not those of the unsuspecting public. It also provides a
flexible standard in line with strict liability concepts, and encompasses
more types of "products" and variations of business/consumer
relationships.
1 64
consumer's expectation. Because the doctrine is consumer oriented, perhaps the greater
weight should be given to expectation within the equation.
162. See, eg., Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292; United Pac. Ins. Co. v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 707, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822-23 (1985).
163. Comment, Strict Products Liability for Injuries Prior to Sale or Delivery: A Proposed
"Stream of Commerce" Test, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 823-24 (1979).
[A] product is in the stream of commerce when it has been placed or situated in such
a manner that danger to the consuming public in general or certain persons in partic-
ular exists. One or all of the following factors may be considered in determining the
question of whether a product meets this test: (1) Whether the manufacturer has
completed the process of manufacture, including testing of the product in question
(except testing in areas in which the danger to the consuming public in general 'or to
specific non-employees in particular exists would not insulate the manufacturer from
liability); (2) whether the product is being used at the time of the injury; (3) the
physical location of the product at the time of the injury (in other words, in transit,
on the manufacturer's plant, etc.); (4) whether a danger to the consuming public in
general or to certain reasonably foreseeable persons in particular has arisen from the
product's physical location at the time of the injury; (5) whether a contract for the
sale of the product has been executed; and (6) the hazardous nature of the product.
Id.
164. In Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857
(1983), a plaintiff sued after suffering severe injuries when struck by a car while standing in the
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A utility company is clearly in the business of selling its particular
product to consumers. However, because the utility does not sell the
equipment to the consumer, courts have determined that strict liability is
inapplicable to electrical transmission facilities. 165  This requirement
seems to have developed to exempt the occasional seller from strict liabil-
ity, the rationale being that the buyer somehow relies less on the non-
merchant seller than the merchant seller. 66 This rationale may have
been proper in early twentieth century civil law when privity was still
necessary. However, the doctrine has extended to third parties and by-
standers in an effort to protect all possible plaintiffs within foreseeable
harm. The Restatement (Second) of Torts comments on this expansion:
The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the special responsi-
bility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters
into the business of supplying human beings with products
which may endanger the safety of their persons and property,
and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of
those who purchase those goods.
167
Extending strict liability to injuries caused by defective design of trans-
mission facilities would be consistent with this policy by placing the bur-
den of responsibility for public safety with the business producing the
product-the utility producing the electricity.
Although a utility company does not sell transmission facilities, and
they are not intended for public consumption, such equipment is an inte-
gral part of both the company's commercial venture and the electrical
product itself. "The consumer is necessarily exposed to the risks of the
entire system."'168 Utility company equipment is omnipresent, and a con-
sumer must completely rely upon its safety. "If placing goods in the
stream of commerce means placing them where they expose the public to
a high risk of harm, a utility company's defective equipment is in the
stream of commerce."' 69
defendant's phone booth. Because the defendant was in the business of maintaining, installing,
fabricating, constructing and refurbishing the telephone booth system, the court agreed that a
jury could find that the risk was foreseeable and the defendant could be held strictly liable for
injuries caused by the defective design of the system. Id. at 58, 665 P.2d at 952, 192 Cal. Rptr.
at 862. Although a distinguishing factor would be that telephone booths are to be used by
members of the public, whereas electrical transmission facilities are not, another important
factor is that the design and placement of the booth was found defective, not only the tele-
phone or booth individually as products.
165. See, e.g., United Pacific, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 706-07, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
166. Comment, supra note 9, at 407.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965).
168. Mallor, supra note 101, at 101.
169. Id. at 102.
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In addition to providing relief to injured consumers, strict liability is
aimed at motivating manufacturers and the ensuing chain of commerce
to make society safer. 170 Why do we draw the line of transformation
from negligence to strict liability at the point of plaintiff's sovereignty
(the home, the meter); why do we not apply strict liability before the
challenged "product" leaves the defendant's hands? The defendant's
participation in the transaction is to manufacture, distribute, lease or
supply the product to the general public (and plaintiff in particular). The
defendant's role is finished and complete when the "product" leaves its
hands. But while the product is still in the manufacturer's hands, ought
we not demand a higher standard of liability for the precise policy rea-
sons articulated by strict liability concerns? Certainly, the defendant
would be in a better position to know of and correct defects.
There would not be "absolute" liability for strict liability causes of
action against facilities, as a Daly'7 ' comparative fault analysis would
prohibit any disproportionate recovery relating to the victim's own negli-
gence. The doctrine would not serve as purely an indemnity device.' 7 2
Manufacturers, and all members of the chain of distribution, would not
be the insurers of the society.' 73 Additionally, the balancing test of the
second Barker prong would allow companies to argue that costs out-
170. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
171. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978).
172. Indeed, the court in Pierce found that Ms. Pierce's home electrical system contained
three defects which could, during trial, be evidence of her own counterbalancing negligence.
Evidence showed that a power cable had cracked insulation, the propane gas system was
grounded improperly and a private well provided an inadequate ground for the entire electrical
system. Pierce, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 84 n.l1, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 292 n.l1. However, a compara-
tive fault analysis could only be performed when a plaintiff actually did something to either
initiate or encourage the injury. If the defect is in the meter, power lines, poles or transformers
and is untouched by the plaintiff, or if the negligent party who initiates the accident is un-
known, the utility company would end up bearing the entire cost.
173. Although a thorough discussion of the impact of products liability insurance on the
tort system is beyond the scope of this Comment, a few thoughts bear mentioning. When
litigation costs and insurance premiums overtake profits, manufacturers will drop their prod-
ucts. The prevalence of mass torts, deep pocket liability, joint and several liability, and uncap-
ped non-economic losses have skyrocketed insurance premiums. These high premiums have
caused manufacturers to drop product lines rather than continue with such payouts. Ulti-
mately, although the public suffers with higher prices and less product availability, the true
cost of the product is exposed. Unfortunately, because insurance premiums are not individual-
ized, companies that have never had a claim against them suffer similar rate hikes as those
with multi-million dollar product liability suits. In considering extension of strict liability to
utilities, the policy decisions assume even greater magnitude in light of insurance uncertainties.
See generally Goldberg, Manufacturers Take Cover, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 52-55. See
supra note 146 for an example of a statutory answer to such questions.
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weigh the benefits. 74
Therefore, with moderate conceptual changes in the definitions of
"product" and "stream of commerce," strict liability could accommo-
date electrical transmission facilities. However, the analytical applica-
tion of the doctrine must be examined according to its logical results to
the legal profession, the utilities, and society itself. How would the ex-
tension of strict liability to transmission facilities affect loss spreading,
risk distribution, plaintiffs' legal burdens, safety, and people's relation-
ship with utilities-the above-mentioned criteria for any extension of the
doctrine?
E. Problems and Results of Applying Strict Liability to Electrical
Transmission Facilities
What would be the burdens and benefits of expanding strict liability
to utility systems? One primary tenet of the doctrine is that the manufac-
turer and chain of distribution participants are in a better position to
absorb the cost of injuries. They then pass the cost on to all users by
factoring in the liability cost to the price of the product, alleviating the
substantial monetary burden of injured unknowing plaintiffs. The added
cost not only compensates victims but provides an incentive to reduce the
possibility of accidents. In a balanced market, the manufacturer with
more defects, and hence more liability cost, would need to charge a
higher price. By keeping their liability to a minimum, competitors will
charge a lower price, and garner a higher percentage of the market. In
other words, those who seek to profit from a product should bear the cost
associated with its production.
The twin goals of strict liability, compensation and deterrence, how-
ever, are best served not by singular systems of recovery (i.e., an insur-
ance system could best compensate injured victims, but would provide no
deterrent effect) but by the most efficient allocation of resources. 175 Pro-
fessor Calabresi 176 sets out three components of accident costs: primary
costs (number and severity of accidents); secondary costs (society's costs
of its failure to fully compensate victims); and tertiary costs (costs of
administrating an accident system).'
77
174. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
175. See Calabresi & Hirshoff, Toward a Testfor Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972).
176. Id.; see also Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
177. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 24 (1970).
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Since every purchase of every product is a decision among substi-
tutes or alternatives, supply and demand analysis would reflect the true
social cost of utility services. This cost would include compensation for
medical treatment, wage loss, labor, materials and production elements.
The activities which are more accident prone would experience a greater
price rise probably resulting in less participation in those activities.
Because of the high social need and use of electricity, the above
equation would probably result in increased prices and minimal decline
of usage. 178 One could argue that because of the higher price, and a pos-
sibility that the availability of electricity could decline (as opposed to its
use), the long range impact would be to deprive those unable to pay for
the increased cost of the product. This reduction would be concentrated
on the poor.179 It is hard to say whether an adjustment of liability would
have such an effect, however, as it would take the market some time to
balance the cost/demand principles necessarily involved.
Obviously, this type of economic analysis applies whenever strict lia-
bility governs the sale of any product. The difference here is that elec-
tricity (as well as gas, water, and other utilities) is absolutely necessary to
modern life and is not governed by the same economic choices made
regarding automobiles, appliances, and other "pure" products. 80 Courts
may find that design defects in electrical systems could only be cured by
insulating every existing power line, redesigning entire transmission sys-
tems or by moving all transmission lines underground. Such costs would
be astronomical.
Applying strict liability to electric utilities could reduce the adminis-
trative costs forced by the use of the negligence system. Victims who
prove negligence get only about fifty percent of their compensation from
damage awards. 18 1 Attorneys, courts and insurance companies typically
178. Since electricity is such a necessary part of modern daily life, there probably would not
be much decline in use. However, because the amount of recovery based on strict liability may
not be much more than that based on negligence, the price may not rise as much either. For
example, if the amount of recovery under strict liability was $100 million more per year, and
there are 10 million users in the state, the yearly price increase would only be $10 per user.
179. Like most regressive systems, the poor are forced to pay a higher percentage of their
earnings to obtain needed services. If the increase is not so exorbitant, perhaps the price would
be worth it. Many poor people do not own homes nor, as tenants, do they have direct access to
electrical transmission devices. Their only recourse may be to their landlord who will charge
higher rents.
180. A free market can support an elastic price/demand ratio. Utilities are not free mar-
kets. People cannot make the same choices of what, when, and whether to buy electricity as
they can with other products.
181. Comment, supra note 9, at 444; see also Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery:
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rav. 774 (1967); Franklin, Chanin &
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receive in total more money than the injured plaintiffs. 182 Furthermore,
because of the unpredictable nature of proving a negligence case, the pat-
tern of awards can be arbitrary. Often it is the severely injured plaintiff
who needs recovery most, yet who is forced to wait years for unassured
compensation.1
83
The negligence system is expensive. To reduce the number of fac-
tual questions (as would occur if strict liability were imposed) would
lighten the amount of time and expense that juries, judges, counsel and
witnesses incur. Additionally, because there would be less incentive for
defendant companies to wait out the trial, settlements would be en-
couraged. Congestion would lighten and cases that did go to trial would
be shorter and less complex. Applying strict liability would assist the
injured plaintiff in quickly receiving much needed compensation.
However, the complexity and factual issues would only be lessened,
not eliminated. It could also be argued that since there is a relatively
small amount of plaintiffs who go to court in electrical liability cases, the
actual savings would be minimal. In computing the monetary cost of
extending strict liability to utility facilities, the questions arise-where
would the line be drawn; which utilities would be covered? Gas, water
and telephone companies would all assumedly be subject to the extended
liability.
The public nature of electrical utilities raises additional problems
when trying to apply strict liability to such enterprises. Initially, they are
different entities than normal businesses that provide services or deliver
products. Electric utilities are subject to strict rate and safety regula-
tions. Their rates cannot respond to free market supply/demand analysis
in the same fashion as other hybrid enterprises. Nor can any business
with an inclination open up an electricity producing company. A busi-
ness must apply to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a certifi-
cate and pass a stringent test of whether public convenience and necessity
require such a company.1
84
The public function of utilities also creates a duty to continue to
Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1961).
182. See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reim-
bursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967); Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961).
183. By reducing the amount of time each trial would take, injured plaintiffs would receive
their nuch needed recovery sooner. The same could be said for the impetus provided by strict
liability for defendants to settle.
184. CAL. PUB. UTL. CODE § 1001 (West 1975).
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provide services after they have started. 185 A company cannot shut
down without proper procedures designed to ensure that the public will
continue to be adequately served. Whether or not including certain resi-
dences for service delivery is profitable to the utility, it has a public duty
to continue the delivery of the product:
As its name indicates, the term "public utility" implies a public
use and service to the public; and indeed, the principal determi-
native characteristic of a public utility is that of service to, or
readiness to serve, an indefinite public (or portion of the public
as such) which has a legal right to demand and receive its serv-
ices or commoditites.1
86
In this respect there is no difference between a privately owned utility
and a publicly owned one. They both are under such a legal duty and are
controlled by the same regulations.
Electric utilities are also required to obtain approval from the PUC
whenever they propose rate adjustments. The approval is given only af-
ter a complete examination procedure which includes a public hearing.
18 7
Given the attitude toward cost of living increases, it is common for the
public to refuse to endorse rate increases. Public utilities are limited in
the amount they may "reasonably" spend on upkeep and expansion.'88
Utilities are likewise limited in the amount of profit they are entitled to
make. 1
89
It seems that utilities will encounter many obstacles in trying to pass
the cost of strict liability to the users of the product. However, given that
the dollar amount could be minimal to each consumer, perhaps society
would be willing to devise a risk spreading system to allow such
increases.
The balance of power between legislatures and the courts must be
strictly defined in areas of utility control. Utilities are statutorily created
and legislatively controlled. Perhaps, an initial approach would be to
change the PUC regulations regarding utility liability. The reason liabil-
ity was imposed in Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. was that, even
though the court acknowledged that the PUC has the power, by rule, to
185. 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities §§ 1, 16 (1972).
186. Id. § 1.
187. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454(c) (West Supp. 1986). "The commission shall permit
individual residential public utility customers affected by a proposed rate increase to testify at
any hearing on the proposed increase. . . ." Id.
188. Id. § 454(a).
189. Id. § 451. "All charges demanded or received by any public utility.., for any product
or commodity furnished... shall be just and reasonable." Id.
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limit their liability, it had not done so. 19' If findings warranted extending
liability, either PUC regulations or the utility statutes could be amended.
Courts must be careful in interpreting the laws of the state not to over-
step their power by legislating. The legislative system of representative
government, in expressing the will of the people, should be the body that
can best satisfy the population's needs in areas of business regulation.
A final impediment to the establishment of strict liability for electric
utility enterprises is the danger of dual standards when municipal compa-
nies plead sovereign immunity. There have been no reported cases that
allow the pleading of strict liability against the state or its municipalities.
The California Tort Claims Act of 196311 establishes no common law
governmental tort liability "except as otherwise provided by statute."' 92
Certain statutes provide for governmental liability.' 93 The statutes regu-
lating public utilities do not." 4
Therefore, even if courts could impose strict liability on privately
owned utilities, they could not impose such liability upon municipally
owned enterprises. The problems are manifest. The two provide the ex-
act same service/product, the rates and regulations governing both are
the same, and the types of accidents and defects possible are identical.
Yet, only privately owned enterprises could be subject to strict liability.
Those injured by privately held utilities would have the lesser burden;
those injured by publicly held ones would have the greater. Strict liabil-
190. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 77-78, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287-
88 (1985). PG&E argued that a judgment in strict liability would contradict an order of the
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), whose decisions were to be reviewable only by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court. Id. (citing PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1759 (West 1975)). PG&E asserted that
rule 31.1 of General Order No. 95 shielded the utility from liability. Rule 31.1 reads as
follows:
Electrical supply and communication systems shall be of suitable design and con-
struction for their intended use, regard being given to the conditions under which
they are to be operated, and shall be maintained in a condition which will enable the
furnishing of safe, proper and adequate service.
The owners and employees of such systems shall at all times exercise due care to
reduce to a minimum the hazard of accidental injury to their own or fellow employ-
ees, to the public and other utilities due to the presence of overhead wires.
Id. at 77 n.2, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 287 n.2 (emphasis in original).
The court held that the rule imposed, rather than limited, a duty of care. Moreover, the
court found the rule applicable to those factual situations where people come in contact with
overhead wires. Where the defective electricity is actually received by the consumer at her
home, the rule does not apply. Id. at 78, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
191. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980).
192. Id ; see also Datil v. City of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App. 2d 655, 69 Cal. Rptr. 788
(1968).
193. See, eg., CAL. VEH. CODE § 17001 (West 1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West
1982).
194. There is no liability unless expressed within the statute.
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ity, indeed, the entire tort law, could not condone a double standard such
as this. The distinction would be irrational and capricious. If the per-
centage of publicly owned utilities was minimal such that imposing strict
liability was procedurally possible, perhaps there would be a chance that
legislatures would amend the public utility law to provide for its imposi-
tion, but it is not very likely.
Even if courts prove reluctant to impose strict liablility for injuries
caused by defectively designed transmission equipment, might they im-
pose liability for injuries caused by defective design or equipment on a
consumer's private property? The argument in favor of this liability is
that once the electricity comes onto a consumer's private property, the
expectation of the consumer is that the voltage will be at a certain level
and in a certain condition. In Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co.,19 a boy
was injured when he touched an uninsulated wire on the roof of a build-
ing where he was working. The court ruled that since the wire was at-
tached to a pole on private property as opposed to public property, strict
liability attached.'96 The countervailing considerations remain the same
however, and this argument ultimately only seeks to extend the "bright
line" to plaintiff's property line, rather than the meter.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is continuous tension between the needs of manufacturing in-
stitutions in our society and the needs of the populace. Changing one
automatically affects the other. To increase the legal vulnerability of
electric companies is justified by the strong societal interests of safety,
compensation and social evolution. Such changes would almost certainly
lead to increased costs, but expense is no cogent reason to forestall neces-
sary legal developments. Additionally, the legislature could be con-
vinced that an in-depth study of the consequences of applying strict
liability to utilities is necessary to protect the population.
However, until such analysis and weighing is done, courts should
refrain from entering such virginal territory. It is the legislature's job to
implement administrative procedures for such purposes. It is also the
legislature's job to streamline the safety and rate structures. Finally, if it
is decided that the complete insulation of bare wires or the underground
placement of the transmission facilities is necessary, it is the legislature
again who must act. If necessary, the legislature could redevise the sov-
195. 73 Mich. App. 347, 251 N.W.2d 580 (1977).
196. Id. at 356, 251 N.W.2d at 584-85 (emphasis added).
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ereign immunity laws and redraft the utility statutes, but until that is
done, the courts should interpret the law as it stands.
A change in the conceptual definitions of "product," "stream of
commerce," "service," and "strict liability" would be necessary and
these would probably be within the province of the judiciary. The many
legislative changes necessary to evade the problems associated with ex-
tending strict liability to electric utility services would be radical enough.
Although the expansion of strict liability by courts is laudable and
should be applied in every appropriate circumstance, electric utility lia-
bility does not seem to be one of the places. It was questioned earlier
whether, because Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 197 and United Pa-
cific Insurance Co. v. Southern California Edison Co. 198 were reconcila-
ble, they were also consistent with present California strict liability law
and its underpinnings? Until both the courts and legislature are ready to
implement the comprehensive conceptual, legal and logical changes nec-
essary to extend the doctrine of strict liability, the law should stand as it
is.
Malcolm Loeb
197. 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1985).
198. 163 Cal. App. 3d 700, 209 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1985).
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